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Does working alongside friends or relations lower or raise productivity? We supplement evidence on the issue through a field experiment in Uttar Pradesh, India conducted with married couples. Teams of four are engaged to dig soil. In one treatment husbands and wives work together; in the other treatment they work in separate teams. We find that working with spouses is associated with significantly higher team productivity. in particular, when rewards are earned through actual labour.
1 With features such as onsite assignment to treatment and the presence of non-local supervisors, we do not claim this was a natural field experiment.
The experiment was conducted by financing work within the rules of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA control) each team of four consisted of 2 men and 2 women, none of whom were married to one another. However, for one man and one woman their spouses were working in another site nearby under the same conditions. In treatment two, teams also contained 2 men and 2 women but in this case two members of each team were spouses. The other two individuals were not married to one another or to anyone else taking part in the experiment. The team members were paid at the rate of Rs 2 per cubic foot of soil successfully removed from the site and dumped, subject to local NREGA rules that dictate a minimum wage of Rs100 per working day. 2 The fieldwork was carried out in three culturally homogeneous blocks of rural sample of 540 workers, stratified by sex (equal numbers) and status (registered couples and non-registered) were short listed at the five sites and invited to take part. On the days of the experiment, the total number of participants that took part was 516. 3 A total of 258 participants were in the form of married couples while 129 male and 129 female were unaccompanied individuals. 4 The experiments were carried out over 4 days: digging at sites number 2 (Madiya) and 3 (Mowiya) were carried out on the same day (day 2) to prevent contamination of data between the neighbouring villages and achieve the target of playing a total of 30 groups per day.
On a game day the participants from the prepared list were ticked for presence and randomly assigned to treatment. Afterwards, each team was taken to their on the area. The workers were asked to dig for 3.30 hours (which was timed) and than take a lunch break and come back to their pits. Post lunch the experimenter publicly measured the length, breadth and height of the pit dug by each team.
The earnings of the team were then calculated and then team members were paid-off individually.
In this context, when the spouses are separated as in treatment 1, they cannot coordinate their efforts. When they play in the same game, they can coordinate.
Typically, therefore we would expect that, for players from a cooperative household average output will be higher when spouses play together than when apart. However, male and female effort is complementary in this game, meaning that there may be multiple Nash equilibria. Treatment may move play from one equilibrium to another.
To see this, it may be useful to introduce a basic model of the design in order to aid the interpretation of the results. Individual reward in this experiment is proportional to team output, y, which in turn is given by the expression ) , min( is a positive parameter that may vary across individuals. 5 Consider a household that maximizes a weighted average of its net payoffs.
When the spouses are separated as in treatment 1, each spouse takes part in his or her own game. The household payoffs are, It follows that as long as λ ε (0,1) then at the largest Nash equilibrium, average output is higher when spouses play together than when apart. In particular if the household places equal weight on the partners and all players have the same effort costs, then expected output is 50% higher in treatment 2 compared to treatment 1. However, two other effects might also cause a difference between treatments. First, it is possible that the largest Nash equilibrium is not the equilibrium actually played in the game and moreover that the treatment moves teams from one equilibrium to another. Secondly, the appropriate household model may not be a cooperative one. In particular, individual effort may be harder to observe when couples are apart and this may lead to different behaviour between treatments (Ashraf, 2009 ). In both these cases, it is theoretically possible for output to be lower when spouses play in the same team. 7 4. R 4. R 4. R 4. Results. esults. esults.
esults.
Altogether, in each of the two treatments there were 172 participants making 86 teams of four. Table 1 sets out some basic information obtained in an ex-post survey. In addition to obvious questions such as age, land-owned, education and social group, we asked individuals about the time they typically spend working with their spouses in a standard week. We also asked them to specify how many members of their team were known to them prior to the experiment. Mean responses do not differ significantly between treatments. 7 That may seem unlikely, but for instance suppose that spouses are engaged in a repeated game and condition their post-game behaviour on in-game effort. Low effort is punished and high effort is rewarded by subsequent behaviour. When effort is observable this is straightforward, but when spouses work in different teams only output is observable. In this situation, subjects working separately might work harder so as to decrease the probability of the bad signal provided by low output. The key result is summarized in figure 1 which shows the distribution of output for the two treatments. The frequency scale reports the number of individuals in each output class. Mean group output was 169 for treatment 2 and 111.9 for treatment 0, a difference of approximately 50% and we reject the hypothesis of no treatment effect at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney test on teams, z=4.024, p<0.001). generally, couples who work more often together in daily life have higher productivity. However, for these couples, the impact of treatment is weaker. The number of known players in the game is also positively associated with productivity, while a higher value for the age of the oldest female in the group is associated with lower output. Finally, separate NREGA bank accounts are associated with higher productivity. 8 In this simple field experiment, mixed sex teams of four dig holes and move dirt to another site nearby. Couples are randomly assigned to one of two treatments.
In the first, couples work separately and in the second couples work together. In all cases the team is paid according to the volume of soil removed successfully in a working day. We find that teams with paired couples consistently outperform teams where spouses are separated from their partners. The output gap between the two systems is large, by approximately 50%. This result is consistent with a household model in which equal weight is placed on both partners and effort costs are proportional to the square of the output. However, it is also consistent with a change of Nash equilibrium between treatments and with some forms of non-cooperative model of the household in which team working enables spouses to monitor more closely the efforts of the partner (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) . In contrast to some of the recent work on social connections and the workplace, we also find a positive relationship between output and other kinds of social contact.
A feature of our results is that couples who work together more frequently outside the experiment have higher productivity within the control group.
However, within treatment 2 the effect is not significant. It is possible that spouses who do not work regularly together are more strategic within their marital relationship compared to spouses who work together. That is, spouses who do not work together, shirk when not being observed by their partners.
